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Hong Kong lacks a statutory corporate rescue regime, despite repeated attempts
at legislative reform beginning with recommendations made in 1996 by the Law
Reform Commission (LRC). Eachattemptatpassinga version ofso-called "pro-
visional supervision" failed due to irreconcilable views of diverse stakeholders.
The main point of contention has centred on the treatment of labour claims
and, in particular, on the feasibility of full satisfaction of labour claims as a
precondition to entering provisional supervision. In October 2009 the govern-
ment of Hong Kong tried once again to bridge the differences with proposals set
forth in a consultative paper entitled Review of Corporate Rescue Procedure
Legislative Proposals, issued by the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau
(FSTB). This article addresses two key issues relating to the possible enactment
of a provisional supervision regime in Hong Kong - (1) the need to achieve
acceptable compromise on the treatment of employees' outstanding entitlements
and (2) the advantages of including a hybrid debtor-in-possession approach that
would allow management in certain cases and with creditor approval to con-
tinue administering the debtor during the statutory rescue process.
Introduction
It has long been recognised that Hong Kong needs a statutory corporate
rescue regime. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the recent
global financial crisis only underscored the inadequacy of existing legisla-
tion.
With this article the authors wish to expand upon and to relay to a broader audience comments
and proposals they initially expressed in a submission to the Hong Kong Financial Services and
the Treasury Bureau (FSTB) in response to its Consultation Paper - Review of Corporate Rescue
Procedure Legislative Proposals, 16 Apr 2010. As of this writing, the Consultation Paper is avail-
able online at http//www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/review crplp e.pdf.
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Following recommendations made in 1996 by the Law Reform Com-
mission (the LRC) in its Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trad-
ing in October 1996,' legislation was introduced in January 2000 in the
form of the Companies (Amendment) Bill 20002 to address this defi-
ciency. The 2000 Bill proposed a corporate reorganisation regime known
as "provisional supervision", which, in the broadest terms, would allow a
company in financial distress temporary relief from individual creditor
actions and provide the opportunity for a voluntary arrangement to be
agreed with creditors without having to go to court. Provisional supervi-
sion would commence with the appointment of an insolvency specialist,
or "provisional supervisor", to take over the business administration and
formulate and secure creditor approval of the "voluntary arrangement
proposal". During provisional supervision the company would be pro-
tected by a moratorium on the enforcement of creditors' claims. However,
the 2000 Bill encountered serious opposition from stakeholders - most
significantly in response to its proposed treatment of secured creditors'
and workers' claims. The proposed legislation would have allowed credi-
tors as a group to impair the rights of secured creditors, and would have
required as a precondition to using provisional supervision that a com-
pany must beforehand either pay, in full, all workers' wages and entitle-
ments (pursuant to the Employment Ordinance (Cap 57)) or set up a
trust fund with sufficient funds to make such payments.' The 2000 Bill
was withdrawn.
Again in 2001 a bill was introduced to the Legislative Council to
implement the LRC's proposals, this time in the form of a new piece of
legislation entitled the Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill.' As com-
pared to the 2000 Bill, the 2001 Bill safeguarded the status of secured
creditors from impairment by creditors as a group, but did not change
the priority treatment of workers' entitlements. Once again, opposition
from stakeholders with divergent views forced the bill to be abandoned.
In a September 2002 consultation paper, the government proposed a cap
on payments to workers to bring the treatment of workers in provisional
supervision into line with the maximum amount payable to workers in
compulsory liquidation under the Protection of Wages on Insolvency
I Available at http://www.info.gov.hklhkrefrom/reports/index.htm, which followed the Law
Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (June 1995).
2 The Bill (the 2000 Bill) was gazetted on 7 Jan 2000. See Hong Kong Government Gazette, Legal
Supplement No 3, C5.
For a discussion of the 2000 Bill, see Philip Smart and Charles D. Booth, "Reforming Corporate
Rescue Procedures in Hong Kong" (2001) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 485.
Hong Kong Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, C615 (18 May 2001), (the 2001 Bill).
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Ordinance (Cap 380) (ie, HK$278,500). This cap was retained in the
Hong Kong Government's revised proposal regarding workers' entitle-
ments, which was put forward in September 2003 (the 2003 Proposal)
and presented to the Legislative Council in 2004.6
From time to time over the next eight years, rumours circulated about
a third attempt at enactment of provisional supervision, but a new bill
never materialised. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong courts stepped into the
vacuum and starting with Re Keyview Technology BVI Ltd [2002] 2 HKLRD
290 proved receptive to the creative use by insolvency practitioners of a
non-statutory scheme that mimicked key aspects of provisional liquida-
tion to facilitate corporate rescue. But after several other cases adopted
this approach, starting with Re Legend International Resorts Ltd [2006]
HKCA 757 the Hong Kong courts put limits on this judicial innovation.
By 2006, it appeared that the government was not going to resuscitate its
provisional supervision proposals.'
However, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 refocused the
Hong Kong Government's attention to this legislative deficiency and has
led to another attempt at enacting a version of provisional supervision. In
October 2009, the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB) issued
a paper entitled, Review of Corporate Rescue Procedure Legislative Proposals
(Consultation Paper).' In addition to putting forth 19 questions regarding
provisional supervision for comment, the Consultation Paper reviewed
the earlier legislative proposals and presented new alternatives to address
the concerns of stakeholders, and particularly the concerns on the dis-
position of employment claims, which had historically been the central
point of contention among stakeholders. Specifically, the Consultation
Paper reviewed the 2003 Proposal that would require a distressed com-
pany to satisfy (or set up a trust account to satisfy) workers' entitlements
The Ordinance provides for the payment of certain employment entitlements by the Protec-
tion of Wages on Insolvency Fund, namely:
(a) Arrears of wages - wages for services rendered during the four months prior to the last day
of service but not exceeding HK$36,000;
(b) Wages in lieu of notice of termination - wages in lieu of notice up to one month's wages
or HK$22,500, whichever is the lesser; and
(c) Severance payment - the lesser of HK$220,000 and an amount equal to HK$50,000 plus
50% of the balance of any entitlement under the Employment Ordinance in excess of
HK$50,000.
6 See http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOO-01/english/bc/bcl2/papers/bci2chl-2185-le.pdf.
For a discussion of this case development, see Stephen Briscoe & Charles D. Booth, The Hong
Kong Corporate Insolvency Manual (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 2nd edn, 2009), pp 181-184.
Charles D. Booth, "The Race of Two Tortoises: Insolvency Law Reform in Hong Kong and
China", (Nov 2006) 2(2) ABA China Law Reporter 3.
The Consultation Paper is available online at http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/
review ctplp e.pdf.
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up to a statutory cap of HK$278,500 prior to commencing provisional
supervision. The FSTB also suggested two new alternative approaches:
"Alternative A", which would exempt employment claims from the mor-
atorium on the enforcement of creditor actions; and "Alternative B",
which would allow the debtor up to 45 days after the commencement
of provisional supervision to satisfy employment claims up to a statutory
limit (or up to 60 days if the moratorium were to be extended) and up to
12 months to satisfy the remainder of employees' entitlements.
To facilitate the discussion of the FSTB's new proposals, the Institute
of Asian-Pacific Business Law (IAPBL) at the William S. Richardson
School of Law at the University of Hawaii and the Asian Institute
of International Financial Law (AIIFL) in the Faculty of Law at the
University of Hong Kong, with the support of the FSTB and practi-
tioners, organised a symposium entitled, "Corporate Rescue in Hong
Kong: The Government's 2009 Legislative Proposals", which was held
at the University of Hong Kong on 22 January 2010 (the Symposium).
The Symposium addressed a broad array of issues set out in the Consul-
tation Paper. This article intends neither to recap the discussion of all of
the issues discussed at the Symposium nor to respond to all of the ques-
tions posed in the Consultation Paper. Rather, its focus is on improv-
ing the chances of enactment of, as well as the utility or functionality
of, a provisional supervision regime in Hong Kong by addressing two
issues: (1) the need to achieve an acceptable compromise on the treat-
ment of employees' outstanding entitlements; and (2) the benefits of
an approach that would provide for retention of management in some
cases (a hybrid Debtor-in-Possession or DIP approach). On the latter
issue, we wish to make clear at the outset that we are not advocat-
ing an American-style DIP regime for Hong Kong. Rather, for reasons
set forth herein we recommend that Hong Kong enact a modified DIP
approach with various checks and balances that would prove attrac-
tive to debtors and creditors alike - including, importantly, workers
and management, in addition to other stakeholders - and that would
provide a useful alternative for facilitating corporate restructuring in
Hong Kong.
Clearly, to be effective, corporate rescue requires the ongoing com-
mitment and support of employees, but as with the earlier bills, the dis-
position of the distressed company's employees' existing entitlements
proved to be the greatest point of contention among the stakeholders
participating at the Symposium. Symposium participants commented on
the existing proposals and suggested creative approaches and compro-
mises on the treatment of employment claims, which the authors present
and expand upon in part (1) of this article.
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In addition, at the Symposium, Professor Booth proposed that an
effective corporate rescue regime also requires the support, commitment
and in some cases participation of incumbent management, via a so-
called DIP alternative. The DIP proposal received a positive reception
by many of the Symposium participants, and in part (2) of this article, we
set forth in more detail a workable, hybrid approach to corporate rescue
that includes DIP reorganisation as an option.
1. The Treatment of Employees' Outstanding Entitlements
Revisiting the 2003 Proposal (requiring that prior to the initiation of
provisional supervision the debtor must satisfy workers' entitlements
up to a cap of HK$278,500 per worker, either in cash or through the
establishment of a dedicated trust account)
We view the 2003 Proposal as the weakest of the options for address-
ing the treatment of workers' entitlements. We note that only a minority
of the Symposium participants spoke favourably about the 2003 Proposal.
We take as a premise that companies that can afford to pay employ-
ment claims in full on the eve of provisional supervision will have bet-
ter options available to them than provisional supervision. If a debtor
has ordinary income, its creditors would likely prefer to negotiate a
payment plan rather than force it into provisional supervision. By
implication, then, companies with no alternative to provisional super-
vision would need new funding to make payments on the employment
claims, or deplete funds that might be necessary for the restructuring
to succeed.
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s and the
recent global credit crisis, companies in distress are encountering great
difficulty borrowing as banks have tightened their lending standards in
response to the worsening business environment. Nonetheless, several
Symposium participants pointed out that funds are still available where
fund providers see a meaningful opportunity for returns. However, funds
used to pay old debts cannot be used to continue and grow the business;
therefore, requiring new funds be used first to satisfy employment claims
reduces the prospect that new funds will generate returns for the provid-
ers. As a result, bankers and other possible financial sources would likely
view such use as financial waste and prove unwilling to provide funds for
this purpose.10 In effect, requiring upfront payment of all employment
See Philip Smart & Charles D. Booth, "Provisional Supervision and Workers' Wages: An Alter-
native Proposal", (2001) 31 HKLJ 188, 193.
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arrears would in most cases preclude reorganisation under provisional
supervision as an option and, ironically, precipitate the winding up of the
very companies that provisional supervision is intended to rescue.
Moreover, in the absence of outside funding to satisfy workers' enti-
tlements, corporate debtors in distress would quite likely refrain from
paying trade and bank creditors, with a view to hoarding as much cash
as possible for workers. This would be an undesirable consequence as it
would further hinder the ability of such debtors to operate with the sup-
port of their creditors.n
Alternative A - Exempting Employment Claims from the Moratorium
As noted in the Consultation Paper" and also by several Symposium par-
ticipants, the main critique of Alternative A is that giving the employees
the right to petition for liquidation at any time increases the uncertainty
for creditors in provisional supervision and decreases the likelihood of
facilitating a successful reorganisation. In the words of one Symposium
participant, preservation of that right gives employees "gunpoint" bar-
gaining power: the employees would be in position to demand upfront
payment in full as a condition of allowing the reorganisation, to the det-
riment of the reorganisation and other creditors.
This uncertainty is of course based on the unknown propensity of
the courts to grant liquidation even when other interested parties are
committed to reorganisation and repayment of employment arrears is
contemplated. One contra example raised in the Symposium was that of
the UDL Group, a victim of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s,
in which the court refused to grant an order for a winding up even after
much procedural manoeuvring.
Still, as the Symposium made clear, many creditors' groups and insol-
vency practitioners are not in favour of this alternative due to the inher-
ent uncertainty that it creates. We agree.
" See ibid (Noting that this would, in turn "create what, in other circumstances, might be con,
demned as a preference").
1 See para 4.6, at p 22.
1 See UDL Argos Engineering and Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin (2001) 4 HKCFAR 358 and
[2001] 3 HKLRD 634. The relevant portion of the decision may be found in Briscoe & Booth
(n 7 above), pp 179-180.
276 Charles D. Booth & Trevor N. Lain (2010) HKLJ
Alternative B - 45-day Delay in Payment on Employment Claims
As the Symposium made clear, other creditors and possible DIP lenders
would be more amenable to reorganisation if the deadline for payment
on employment claims were deferred until 45 days after the initiation of
provisional supervision (or up to 60 days if the moratorium were to be
extended). While a 45-day delay in payment may look less advantageous
to employees in contrast to the two options set out above, stakeholders
should note that: (1) as the Consultation Paper recognises,14 payment on
employment claims would not in actuality be meaningfully later under
this alternative than in winding up; (2) even with such delay employees
would receive better treatment of their claims than their counterparts in
most other countries with corporate rescue regimes; and (3) unlike the
other two options noted above, such a delay dramatically increases the
likelihood that workers get paid and the debtor company is rescued. As
many participants stated at the Symposium, the challenge is convincing
labour that they are not getting a bad deal under this alternative.
However, it is equally important to note that a successful reorganisa-
tion requires the support of current employees. Even though the employ-
ees' situation under Alternative B places employees in a very strong
bargaining position, it creates an inherent conflict between employees
who want immediate payment for arrears and timely payment on future
services, and the provisional supervisor who seeks to safeguard the debt-
or's remaining assets for purposes of reorganisation. Employees may not
agree to wait 45 days to be paid for work performed before and after the
commencement of the provisional supervision. This tension suggests a
slightly modified arrangement that emerged at the Symposium, discussed
here as Alternative C.
Alternative C - Earlier, Staggered Payments on Employment Claims
Because of labour's strong bargaining position, a more practical alterna-
tive to Alternative B would be to begin paying on employment claims
'4 Consultation Paper, p 24, para 4.15 ("As there is currently a time-lag while employees apply for
legal aid and then petition to the court for winding up, employees should not be significantly
worse off than in the case of insolvent liquidation").
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earlier in the reorganisation but at a lower initial cap."s Under one such
proposal broached at the Symposium, within 20 days of the commence-
ment of provisional supervision, the provisional supervisor would have to
pay employees' wages and other arrears, but not severance payments, up
to a certain cap, eg HK$21,000 or HK$36,000. Then, within 45 days of
commencement, the provisional supervisor would be obliged to cover up
to, say, HK$60,000 of wages and arrears. This compromise would provide
employees with adequate assurance of timely payment, would thereby
mitigate conflict between the employee and the provisional supervisor,
and would thus provide an incentive for employees to remain with the
debtor.
Alternative D - Expanding the Role of the PWIF (or Creating a New
Fund) to Satisfy Employment Claims in Provisional Supervision Cases
The existence of multiple entrances to insolvency procedures is often
an accident of history and renders the process hostage to past precedent.
Having multiple entrances allows different interested parties to initiate
conflicting insolvency processes. This unfortunately is the current situa-
tion in Hong Kong as demonstrated in the following table: 16
1 The Consultation Paper noted that Professor Booth and the late Professor Philip Smart put
forward a similar proposal to Alternative B back in 2001. Consultation Paper, p 23, n 25. See
Smart & Booth (n 10 above), pp 195-198. This "alternative proposal" provided that "every
proposal by a provisional supervisor for a voluntary arrangement ... must contain a provision
to the effect that any outstanding employees' protected debts will be immediately satisfied in
cash upon the voluntary arrangement coming into effect". Ibid. at p 197. Moreover, the recom-
mendation was for the proposal to be put to the creditors' meeting within an initial moratorium
period of 30 days, and if the moratorium were to be extended by the court the legislation should
expressly state that the moratorium could not be extended unless the provisional supervisor
undertook to pay all of the employees' protected debts within 14 days of the court granting the
extension. Thus, it was envisioned that in the ordinary course of events, workers might well
be paid within 30 days of commencement of provisional supervision and, in any event, within
45 days.
16 Which originally appeared as Table 1 in Smart & Booth (n 10 above), p 194.
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Comparison of Treatment of Outstanding Workers' Wages under Various
Insolvency Procedures
Type of Compulsory Creditors' Receivership Provisional Alternative
Case Winding Up Voluntary Supervision Proposal
Liquidation (the Corporate (Suggested
Rescue Bill) by Smart &
Booth)
Amount HK$36,000 HK$8,000 HK$8,000 All debts HK$36,000
(max)* (max) (max) under (no limit) (max) as
from PWIF under s 79, as employee's
s 265, as preferential protected
preferential creditor debt" in
creditor provisional
supervision
Time Limit No wages No wages No wages No time limit No wages
outside outside outside outside
4-month 4-month 4-month 4-month
period period period period
In a compulsory winding up, an employee's claim as a preferential creditor for outstanding
wages is HK$8,000; that sum is often claimed by the PWIF, having already made (larger) pay-
ments to the employee from the Fund.
Smart and Booth introduced the concept of "employees' protected debts" "to precisely track the
various amounts which may presently be claimed from the PWIF upon a compulsory liquida-
tion". Smart & Booth (n 10 above), p 197.
A significant weakness of Alternative A is that it continues this trend
and creates yet further conflicting incentives. So long as the workers are
of the view that they will do better in a compulsory liquidation, they
will be motivated to disrupt the restructuring being pursued in the provi-
sional supervision, and thus create yet more uncertainty that would most
surely drive new funding away and scuttle the rescue attempts.
It is therefore important to reduce the possibility that certain credi-
tors, acting in pursuance of their own parochial interests, would force
the liquidation of a company with good restructuring prospects. One
simple way to eliminate cross incentives is to provide upfront pay-
ments on employment claims, as by expanding the role of the Protec-
tion of Wages on Insolvency Fund (PWIF or the Fund) to extend to
provisional supervision. It should be noted that although the FSTB
stated that Professors Smart and Booth put forward a proposal that
was similar to what emerged as Alternative B, that was actually
Smart and Booth's back-up proposal. Smart and Booth argued: "These
commentators would respectfully agree with the LRC that the most
rational approach to workers' wages would be to extend the PWIF to
provisional supervision"." They noted that they were putting forward
1 Ibid. at p 195.
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an alternative proposal "in light of the refusal to extend the ambit
of the PWIF"." We would suggest that Alternatives B and C above
should only be considered in the absence of support for extending the
PWIF to provisional supervision cases - or perhaps creating a new fund
- what we are now calling Alternative D.
Using the resources of the PWIF in the first instance to satisfy employ-
ment claims would free up much-needed capital for the restructuring, as
welt as eliminate the risk of past or present employees disrupting the
process.
Several Symposium participants noted that the Fund would be no
worse off by doing so: if the restructuring ultimately failed, the PWIF
would be in no worse position than if the company had liquidated from
the outset. The Fund would also be granted a right of subrogation, so that
if the restructuring succeeded, the Fund could recoup at least a portion of
the amounts it paid on the debtor's employment claims.'9 In such a case,
the upfront payment on employment claims would be, in an economic
sense, a bridge loan.
In our view, expanding the role of the PWIF (or other government
fund) in this fashion provides the best scenario for corporate rescue. With
PWIF payments on employment claims in provisional supervision there
will be greater residual value in the company for existing creditors or to
entice a white knight or new lender. To the extent, then, that the debtor
can rely on the PWIF for help in meeting its employment arrears in pro-
visional supervision, the PWIF will have a greater chance of recouping
the amounts paid out on such arrears.zo
It cannot be ignored, however, that the current board of the PWIF
itself might not be amenable to expanding its ambit to include restruc-
turing. As one Symposium participant noted, the PWIF currently has a
right of subrogation under existing legislation but actual recovery is very
low. However, this is undoubtedly partly because actual recovery is very
low in company liquidations, and the Fund's board likely does not judge
the effort worthwhile. Recovery would certainly be higher in proposed
rescues under provisional supervision. The Fund's board is apparently
also concerned that such an expansion would create incentives for abuse
1s Ibid. at p 196.
9 These, and related, arguments are set forth in ibid. at pp 195-96.
20 This is particularly the case for small to medium-sized enterprise (SME) debtors, particularly
labour-intensive operations, for which employees' long-term service benefits may reach up to
HK$220,000 per person. Upfront payment by the PWIF would arguably save more jobs than
the alternatives.
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of the Fund by unscrupulous employers." However, "[als far as unscrupu-
lous employers are concerned, the Labour Department already has the
ability to prosecute employers who take advantage of their employees'
labour when they are aware that there is no reasonable prospect of the
employees being paid their wages as they become due".22
Several Symposium participants recommended that the Legislative
Council consider establishing a different fund to cover employment
claims in provisional supervision. Such a fund could be granted the right
of subrogation against the debtor in the case of a successful restructuring,
and against the PWIF if restructuring fails and liquidation ensues. Such
a right of subrogation should allay the concerns that the fund would be
rapidly depleted and that it would be "subsidising a failing company" - in
one Symposium participant's words - any more than the PWIF currently
subsidises a failed company. Funding, whether by the PWIF or a new
fund, would only be granted on commencement of provisional supervi-
sion. Some Symposium participants suggested that the new fund, unlike
the PWIF, not rely solely on the business community for its source of
funding.
Alternate E - Private Funding of Employment Claims
Reorganisation often fails to rescue a company but may nonetheless pro-
vide for a better return on creditor claims than a straightforward wind-
ing up of the company, as it allows the debtor to unwind in an orderly
manner, rather than in a fire sale. This is clearly the case if the com-
pany fails during poor economic times, when there might be lower-than-
normal demand for its assets. As already stated above, requiring payment
of employment arrears upon or soon after commencement of provisional
supervision creates an obstacle to the debtor's obtaining the new funding
required to reorganise or undertake a strategic unwinding. Any party that
provides funding to satisfy the employment arrears would face a loss if
reorganisation failed. At the Symposium it was proposed that the party
providing funding for the employment claims be granted a right of sub-
rogation against the PWIF should restructuring fail. Such a right should
enhance the possibility of obtaining new funding.
21 This concern might be unfounded, as one participant noted that the Official Receiver's records
show bankruptcy fraud in far less than 1% of the cases.
22 Smart & Booth (n 10 above), p 195 (citing s 31 of the Employment Ordinance).
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2. Enactment of a Modified, Hybrid Debtor-in-Possession Approach
We would like to discuss the merits of introducing a modified, hybrid DIP
option. We realise that the term "DIP" is a charged one and in the past
has led to a reflexive clamour in Hong Kong that Hong Kong law would
be "Americanized" and become too debtor friendly. The FSTB repeated
similar sentiments in paragraph 1.6 of the Consultation Paper, at p 7:
"The LRC had considered whether a regime similar to Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code could be adopted in Hong Kong, but concluded that they
did not believe that the concept of 'debtor in possession' would be accept-
able to creditors in Hong Kong. There were concerns that if the existing
management was allowed to remain in control, a company could easily avoid
or delay its obligations to creditors. The LRC, therefore, recommended the
appointment of an independent professional third party, the provisional
supervisor, to take effective control of the company during the provisional
supervision period and to formulate a voluntary arrangement proposal for
creditors within a specified timeframe".23
We are well aware of these concerns and wish to reiterate that our DIP
proposal is not the transplantation of the American DIP approach, but
rather is a hybrid model that incorporates a DIP option into the pro-
posed provisional supervision procedure. Our proposal will improve the
existing provisional supervision procedure, make it more attractive to a
broad variety of debtors in Hong Kong, will better protect the interests
of creditors and is quite likely to increase the overall rate of success when
companies pursue provisional supervision.
Under our hybrid approach, there will be two mechanisms in place to
ensure that management does not avoid or delay repayment of its obliga-
tions to creditors. Firstly, when a provisional supervision is commenced,
corporate management may request permission from the company's cred-
itors to be allowed to continue in position as DIP. Permission is to be
granted by a vote of the creditors (for example, the requirement could be
approval by the majority of creditors in amount and including the three
largest creditors). Thus, management will only be allowed to carry on in
position in those instances where it has the support of major creditors.
Secondly, in all cases of provisional supervision a provisional supervisor
will be appointed to protect the interests of creditors.
23 Emphasis in original.
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The Proposed Options
Although we envision that a DIP mechanism will be quite useful to have
in place, we do not believe that it is a panacea and realise that it will not
be appropriate in all cases - it will be an alternative form, not the sole
form, of restructuring. With the enactment of a hybrid DIP approach, we
can envision three potential paths that could be available under provi-
sional supervision, in addition to the option of a compulsory winding up:
1. Where creditors vote in support of management's request for the
debtor to carry on as DIP:
Plan A-i: The provisional supervision proceeds with man-
agement running the debtor's day-to-day affairs and the pro-
visional supervisor acting in a supervisory capacity.
Plan A-2: The provisional supervision proceeds with man-
agement acting in a subordinate capacity under the day-to-
day control of the provisional supervisor.
(Note: Provisional supervision could include either Plan A-1 or Plan
A-2, or (our preference) both Plans A-1 and A-2.)
2. Where creditors reject management's request for the debtor to
carry on as DIP, then, depending on the vote:
Plan B: The provisional supervision proceeds with the provi-
sional supervisor running the day-to-day affairs of the debtor
and management is removed.
Plan C: The debtor is liquidated in a compulsory winding up.
When the debtor commences provisional supervision or within three
days of the commencement of provisional supervision, the debtor's man-
agement would be able to make a request to the provisional supervisor
for management to remain in position and for the debtor to carry on as
DIP. The provisional supervisor would then call a meeting of creditors to
discuss and vote upon the debtor's request." In contrast with an out-of-
court, consensual workout under the Hong Kong Approach," the hybrid
DIP approach contemplates restructuring even in the event there are a
few holdouts among the creditors, in which case the other creditors and
the debtor would benefit from the moratorium.
* We propose for the provisional supervisor, rather than the court, to call the meeting so as to
minimise the court involvement in the procedure, and thereby save costs and expedite the
process. Only in cases involving dispute would recourse have to be made to court.
' See para 1.2 of the Consultation Paper.
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It is a premise of the DIP approach that creditors are fit to determine
whether management is competent and capable of reviving the company.
Giving "veto power" to the creditors helps to align the debtor manage-
ment's interests with those of its creditors and protects against reward-
ing incompetent management and risking further losses. The law should
set forth clear procedures for instances where creditors do not approve
management's DIP request, in which case, depending on the creditors'
vote, the company would be restructured under a traditional provisional
supervision or liquidated in a compulsory winding up.
We envision that giving the creditors veto power over the debtor's
request to continue on as a DIP would lead to early negotiation between
management and creditors and, in many cases, a pre-packaged rescue
plan, which may be considered a more cost-effective alternative.
Further Details of Plans A- I and A-2
Plan A-I
Under Plan A-1, running the debtor's business affairs on a day-to-day
basis would be left to management. The provisional supervisor would act
in a supervisory capacity, with the power to draw on company assets to
employ insolvency practitioners (including attorneys and accountants)
to audit or examine the company and its management at any time dur-
ing the provisional supervision process. Should the provisional supervi-
sor find that the debtor's assets are being wasted or used other than for
the benefit of creditors, or determine the existence of other conflicts of
interest or improprieties, the provisional supervisor could apply to the
court to have management removed and have provisional supervision
continue under Plan B in the form envisioned in the Consultation Paper.
As a safeguard against waste and self enrichment, personal liability for
insolvent trading would stay with the management under Plan A-1.
Under Plan A-1, the provisional supervisor and management would
work together in formulating the rescue plan in the form of a voluntary
arrangement proposal to be put to creditors for their vote.
Plan A-2
Under Plan A-2, the provisional supervisor would take control of the
company as is contemplated for provisional supervision. However, rather
than being displaced, management would be retained in a subordinate
capacity, to advise and assist with the restructuring. It would be up to
the provisional supervisor to determine the continuing role of manage-
ment, if any, under the voluntary arrangement proposal. Under Plan
A-2, personal liability for insolvent trading would shift to the provisional
supervisor after initiation of the provisional supervision.
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Benefits of a DIP Approach
Clearly, it is possible to conform the DIP approach to other political and
economic considerations. We mean here simply to set forth in writing
the two alternatives that arose in discussions during the Symposium.
We were heartened at much of the initial support shown at the Sym-
posium in favour of a hybrid DIP procedure.
A DIP option makes reorganisation a more viable alternative in
many cases for a variety of reasons, including the following: (i) it
incentivises management to begin restructuring earlier; (ii) it makes
reorganisation more acceptable to family-run businesses and small to
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); (iii) it leverages the advantages of
effective management, including industry knowledge and personal
connections; (iv) it encourages pre-packaged rescues; and (v) it may
enhance cross-border co-operation in restructuring (especially with
mainland China).
A DIP Option Can Lead Management to Commence
Restructuring Earlier
Clearly, the more assets and fewer arrears a debtor has, the better pros-
pects the debtor company will have at a successful reorganisation - as it
will have less debt to restructure, more assets with which to continue and
grow its business, and a better balance sheet with which to entice new
creditors and business partners. Where provisional supervision requires
the firing of management - regardless of the circumstances of the insol-
vency or the confidence creditors have in existing management2 6 - the
interests of management and of the company's other stakeholders tend to
diverge as a company becomes more distressed.
Where the corporate rescue procedures require the firing of manage-
ment, there is little incentive for management to seek provisional super-
vision early, as it would mean losing their jobs earlier. Indeed, mandatory
replacement of management on insolvency actually motivates manage-
ment to hide a distressed company's financial status from its creditors
and further deplete assets and accumulate debt in increasingly desperate
16 Insolvency is often caused by factors outside management control, such as factors that reduce
the availability of working capital (eg trouble in the credit markets), that suddenly raise the
cost of inputs (eg speculation in the oil futures markets), or that cause a temporary but drastic
reduction in demand (eg an epidemic, acts of terror or sudden changes in equity or debt markets
that reduce consumer confidence). At other times, management's behaviour or decisions are a
factor, and new management is brought in that might with time determine that restructuring
is in the company's best interest. In such circumstances, punitive treatment of management in
restructuring makes little sense.
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attempts to salvage the company and their jobs." A DIP regime enhances
the probability of a successful restructuring because it overcomes man-
agement hesitancy and resistance to reorganisation and incentivises
management to "come clean" and negotiate with creditors at an earlier
stage, when the business has more assets and fewer arrears.
Even where liquidation is ultimately chosen, early action by man-
agement often results in greater satisfaction of debts than would other-
wise be the case. Thus, a DIP approach makes the restructuring process
less threatening to management, involves creditors earlier, and thereby
enhances the prospect of a successful restructuring or greater satisfac-
tion of debts on liquidation. The creditors would necessarily be in accord
with management, as they would grant their required approval only if
they were satisfied with management's ability to carry out a successful
reorganisation.
A DIP Option Makes Restructuring an Especially Attractive
Alternative to Distressed Family-Run Enterprises and SMEs
For Hong Kong, as for much of the region, the largest foreseeable need
for a corporate restructuring regime is for SMEs, often controlled and
managed by a family. Family-run enterprises, whether SMEs or larger,
have historically been opposed to any corporate restructuring regime
that has no place for the continued participation of existing manage-
ment and that further burdens the distressed business with the cost of
hiring insolvency professionals.28 A son or grandson of the corporate
founder is understandably going to be reluctant to commence provisional
supervision not only because he would fear that the other family mem-
bers and he himself would lose their jobs, but also for reasons of personal
shame in having to take responsibility for the family failure.
To win support among family-run enterprises, the legislative proposal
should provide a way for families to stay involved with the company
undergoing restructuring. A regime that offers the hybrid DIP alternative
27 It is intuitive (and studies confirm) that the farther a company's performance falls below what
management considers normal or acceptable the more risk-prone management becomes in its
attempts to normalise operations. See, eg Philip Bromily, "Testing a Causal Model of Corporate
Risk Taking and Performance", (1991) 34 Academy of Management Journal 37; see also Lucia
Naldi, et al., "Entrepreneurial Orientation, Risk Taking, and Performance in Family Firms",
(2007) 20 Family Business Review 1, 33 (finding that risk taking in family firms is negatively
related to performance).
28 In noting in para 1.12 of the Consultation Paper, at p 9, that, "SMEs may be relatively less likely
to benefit from" provisional supervision, the FSTB identifies the high cost factor but fails to
mention the impact of the displacement of family management.
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stands the best chance of attracting the support of, and compliance by,
family-run enterprises and SMEs. Moreover, in Hong Kong, many large,
and listed, corporate enterprises are family controlled, and the enact-
ment of a hybrid DIP option (or options) would also facilitate the rescue
of such businesses.
Management is not Always Fully Replaceable
In many cases, the displacement of long-term management will severely
handicap the debtor's attempt at reorganising. As compared to a provisional
supervisor, existing management will generally have more thorough knowl-
edge of the relevant industry as well as irreplaceable familiarity with the
company itself. Such knowledge may be of significant utility in restructur-
ing the company. In addition, in family-run enterprises, the goodwill of
the company is often tied up in the family's connections and dealings with
creditors, business partners and customers. Allowing for a DIP approach
would keep the goodwill with the restructuring company for the benefit of
the creditors. It should perhaps not be surprising that when outside man-
agers are brought in and existing management is released, the rescue often
takes the form of a sale of assets or businesses. Retaining existing man-
agement can thus increase the prospects that the business survives intact
(when there are solid financial reasons for doing so) - and jobs thereby
retained - or increase the distribution to creditors on winding up.
A DIP Approach Encourages Pre-packaged Rescues
As noted above, the DIP approach incentivises management to begin
working with creditors earlier than would otherwise normally occur. One
benefit of such collaboration is that the various interested parties can
negotiate and formulate the voluntary arrangement proposal prior to
commencing provisional supervision, which they could present to credi-
tors shortly after the commencement of provisional supervision. Such
a "pre-packaged rescue" would greatly reduce the costs of provisional
supervision for all interested parties, including (importantly) employees.
A DIP Approach May Enhance Cross-border Co-operation
in Restructuring
Almost every corporate insolvency in Hong Kong has cross-border aspects,
especially with mainland China. The difficulties in gaining recognition of
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Hong Kong insolvencies in China are well known." Interestingly, accord-
ing to comments made at the Symposium, there is some indication that
the Mainland is more likely to recognise the authority of Hong Kong liq-
uidators when the liquidators are appointed in voluntary liquidations com-
menced by company directors or shareholders rather than appointed in
court-controlled compulsory liquidations. This result apparently arises from
a misconception by some in the Mainland that liquidators appointed "vol-
untarily" by a company have the endorsement of the company's sharehold-
ers and directors, but that liquidators appointed "involuntarily" are being
appointed against the wishes of a company's shareholders and directors.30
This contention might seem to be counter-intuitive to many Hong
Kong insolvency professionals - and certainly the reasoning is trouble-
some. Nevertheless, there is no denying that it is often difficult for Hong
Kong liquidators to gain the co-operation of parties in the Mainland when
it is clear that disagreements have arisen between liquidators appointed
in a compulsory liquidation and the management of the company. An
accomplished insolvency practitioner reported at the Symposium that a
provisional supervisor is much more likely to secure co-operation from
relevant parties in mainland China (officials, creditors, factory manag-
ers, et al.) if he is introduced by the manager whom they know and with
whom they have previously dealt.
Moreover, adoption of the hybrid DIP approach as proposed here
would create more symmetry with the corporate rescue procedures
recently enacted in mainland China, which would be helpful given the
extent of cross-border operations of many Hong Kong-based companies.
China has recently enacted its own version of a hybrid DIP procedure.
Pursuant to article 73 of the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which
was enacted on 27 August 2006 and came into effect on 1 June 2007
(the 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law), the debtor may apply to
the People's Court for approval to manage its assets and business affairs
by itself under the supervision of an administrator (a new functionary
created as part of the reformed reorganisation procedure). If the People's
Court approves the application, an administrator who has already taken
control of the debtor's property and business affairs must return control
to the debtor. 1 From that day forward, the debtor exercises the adminis-
trator's powers and functions.
29 See Charles Booth, "Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Devel-
opments in China and Vietnam", (2004) 18 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 93, 142-143;
Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth, "Beijing's Initiative on Cross-Border Insolvency:
Reflections on a Recent Visit of Hong Kong Professionals to Beijing", (2001) 31 HKLJ 312,
317-320.
30 See Zhang & Booth (n 29 above), p 320.
" 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Art 73.
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Article 73 of the 2006 PRC Enterprise Law thus corresponds to our
proposed Plan A-i. Article 74 of the PRC law, in turn, provides that
an administrator who has taken charge of a debtor's assets and business
operations may employ the debtor's business managers to take care of
the business operations. Article 74 is thus similar to our Plan A-2. Some
weaknesses of the Chinese law are that it neither sets forth criteria for the
court to use in determining a request by management to remain in posses-
sion nor clarifies the procedure to be followed if a debtor's creditors object
to the appointment. We have tried to avoid these problems by giving the
creditors the right to vote on whether a debtor should continue on as DIP.
Summary of Recommendations
On the Treatment of Employees' Outstanding Entitlements
In our view, Alternative D - expanding the role of the PWIF to extend to
satisfying employment claims in provisional supervision cases, or alter-
natively creating a new fund to do so - remains the best solution for
addressing workers' claims in provisional supervision and for creating
harmony and consistency in Hong Kong's insolvency procedures. How-
ever, if it is not politically feasible for this approach to be adopted, (or
up to 60-day, as the case may be then we would recommend adoption of
Alternative B, with its 45-day) moratorium on the payment of employee
claims, as modified by Alternative C to the extent necessary to garner
political support.
The inability to reach consensus on these difficult issues regarding
the treatment of employees' outstanding entitlements has led to the law
reform process being scuttled twice before. In American baseball jargon,
"three strikes and you're out"; in our view the same will most likely prove
to be the case with provisional supervision. If consensus on workers' enti-
tlements cannot be reached during the current round of consultation,
the most likely scenario is that the government will have to abandon the
provisional supervision approach and start afresh. It is our sincere hope
that it does not come to that, as much thoughtful and excellent work has
been put into formulating a workable provisional supervision approach,
as evidenced by the FSTB's Consultation Paper, the Symposium and sub-
sequent written submissions in response to the Consultation Paper.
On the Enactment of a Hybrid DIP Approach
We hope that the FSTB and the Hong Kong Government give serious
consideration to incorporating a hybrid DIP option into provisional
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supervision. Ideally, we would suggest incorporating both Plan A-I and
Plan A-2. For the reasons stated above, it is our fervent belief that the
incorporation of such a versatile mechanism would greatly improve the
overall rate of success of a provisional supervision procedure.
We realise that our proposal comes late in the consultation process.
We are also aware of the FSTBs comments in paragraph 1.9 of the Con-
sultation Paper, pp 8-9, that "exploding] other fundamentally different
approaches ... will deviate from the consensus already achieved during
the earlier legislative attempts and unduly delay the introduction of a cor-
porate rescue procedure in Hong Kong". In response, we respectfully note
that the consensus as to the earlier attempts to promulgate provisional
supervision was generally negative - which is why we now find ourselves
in the midst of a third version of the provisional supervision proposals,
and which is precisely why we think the time is ripe to introduce alterna-
tives that we believe will garner greater support for provisional supervi-
sion. That being said, we realise that it might prove politically difficult at
this stage to incorporate a hybrid DIP approach into proposed legislation
without conducting public consultation on the proposal and that there
might not be time for such consultation. If that is the case, we would hope
that this proposal at least be floated among interested parties if not more
broadly among the general population to see if there is support. It is our
view that as written - without a hybrid DIP approach - provisional super-
vision will prove quite unpopular for both SMEs and larger, family-run
companies. Later enactment of a hybrid DIP approach through amend-
ment would be better than no enactment at all.
We also hope that the FSTB and the Hong Kong Government appre-
ciate that at present Hong Kong has the best insolvency practitioners in
Asia, but arguably the most deficient corporate rescue law. If Hong Kong
could enact an effective corporate rescue law that incorporated the best
of international practice, Hong Kong's new law could conceivably serve
as a model throughout Asia and become the standard by which to mea-
sure the effectiveness of restructuring in Asia.
Addendum
In July, 2010, the FSTB issued its Review of Corporate Rescue Procedure
Legislative Proposals - Consultation Conclusions (Consultation Conclusions).32
The Consultation Conclusions include discussion of both employees' enti-
tlements and the hybrid DIP approach.
* See http://www.fstb.gov.hklfsb/ppr/consult/doc/review crplp conclusions e.pdf.
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The FSTB "acknowledge[d] that there are difficulties in expanding
the scope of the PWIF" and decided not to proceed with this approach
(Alternative D)." The FSTB noted that "there was majority support for
Alternative B".3 However, "given that the labour sector expressed clear
reservations", the FSTB decided against pursuing a straightforward appli-
cation of Alternative B.35
Instead, the FSTB now proposes a derivation of Alternative B along
the lines of a modified Alternative C. Paragraph 63 of the Consultation
Conclusions provides as follows:
"63. With the benefit of written comments and other formalP6 and informal
discussions, we propose a phased payment schedule for pre-commencement
employees' outstanding entitlements along the following lines:
(a) Arrears of wages before the commencement of provisional supervision
should be paid up to the PWIF cap (i.e. [HK]$36,000 per employee) by the
30th calendar day after the commencement of provisional supervision;
(b) For employees whose employment had been terminated before the com-
mencement of provisional supervision, any outstanding wages in lieu of
notice of termination and severance payments should be paid up to the
PWIF caps:
(i) within 45 calendar days after the voluntary arrangement has been
approved; or
(ii) if the initial moratorium period is extended, within 45 calendar days
from the date of extension;
(c) Any remaining pre-commencement entitlements, including outstanding
employers' contributions under the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes
Ordinance (Cap 485) ('MPFSO') or the Occupational Retirement Schemes
Ordinance (Cap 426) ('ORSO') should be paid in full within 12 months
after the voluntary arrangement has come into effect.
(d) If the company fails to pay according to the above schedule, the employees
concerned will no longer be bound by the moratorium and may petition the
court for winding up the company; and
Ibid. at para 61.
4 Ibid. at para 62.
35 Ibid. at para 6243.
36 Including the Symposium organised at the University of Hong Kong on 22 January 2010 by
IAPBL and AI1FL,
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(e) To facilitate employees to take legal action against the company in case it
fails to pay according to the schedule in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the provisional supervisor will be required to verify the details of debts owed
to employees prior to the commencement of the provisional supervision with
the employees concerned within 30 days after the commencement of provi-
sional supervision."
We hope that the FSTB reconsiders its recommendations in para-
graph 63(c) and (d) requiring the company to pay all employees' enti-
tlements in full. We understand the reasons for the inclusion of these
recommendations, but it is our hope that a company would be man-
dated to pay in full only employees' protected debts or other statutory
obligations - but that additional amounts would be a matter for negotia-
tion amongst the parties, taking the company's financial situation into
account.
In regard to the hybrid DIP approach, paragraphs 121 to 123 of the
Consultation Conclusions state as follows:
"121. There were a few submissions suggesting that a hybrid approach com-
bining both the 'debtor in possession' approach and the provisional supervi-
sion approach. They considered that this hybrid approach would make the
statutory corporate rescue procedure more attractive to SMEs and family-run
businesses.
122. We observe that there are some merits in the hybrid approach, such as
offering more choice for the company, and providing for the option of retain-
ing management in a role which creditors can determine. However, we note
that adopting the hybrid approach will mean a major change in the design of
the corporate rescue procedure. This would complicate the legislative regime
and require more research and consultation. As the introduction of a corpo-
rate rescue procedure is long overdue, we do not consider it as appropriate to
pursue the hybrid approach at the present stage.
123. We will review the need for developing a hybrid approach after the
corporate rescue procedure is introduced".
We are happy to see that the FSTB observed "that there are some merits
in the hybrid approach". However, we hope that rather than waiting
until provisional supervision is introduced, the FSTB and the govern-
ment will instead debate the merits of a hybrid DIP approach during the
drafting stage with a view to considering whether such an approach can
be integrated into the government's proposals.
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